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The shift toward more 
volatile real house price 
growth, unaccompanied 
by a shift in the volatility 
of real GDP growth, offers 
evidence that house price 
dynamics and real output 
growth may have diverged 
beginning around the 
2001 recession.
U.S. house price increases consistently outpaced the rate of inflation 
beginning in the mid-1990s before peaking in 2005. Residential construction 
accelerated in many advanced economies—not just the U.S.—with housing 
accounting for a larger share of real gross domestic product (GDP) as prices 
rose. Many investors, homeowners and even some policymakers seemed to 
assume that house prices would never fall. 
By 2007, emerging strains in housing markets and financial turmoil 
plunged the world economy into a deep and protracted recession from 
which recovery is ongoing. In the aftermath of that recession, the growth 
of real (inflation-adjusted) house prices appears to have moved out of step 
with the growth of real economic activity—indicating a possible break with 
the recent past.
Our findings indicate that the 2007 global downturn wasn’t strikingly 
different from other post-1984 recessions, based on real GDP. After 1984—a 
period known as the Great Moderation because of diminished macroeconom-
ic volatility—stretches of heightened volatility in real GDP growth became 
shorter, roughly corresponding with U.S. recessions. Volatility increased with 
the 2007 downturn, as had happened in other post-1984 recessions.
The findings paint a different picture for real house prices. Volatility in 
house price growth decreased at the onset of the Great Moderation in the 
U.S. A similar decline in volatility extended more broadly to include most 
developed countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), starting in the mid-1990s. However, volatility in house 
price growth substantially reemerged following the 2001 recession, signaling 
a departure from the norm under the Great Moderation.1 
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Data on House Prices and GDP Growth
The findings are derived from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas’ new 
database of international house prices, 
assembled from available national sourc-
es for 19 OECD countries on a quarterly 
basis from first quarter 1975 to fourth 
quarter 2010.2 The house price index 
selected for each country was chosen to 
be comparable to the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency quarterly U.S. house 
price index for existing single-family 
houses (formerly the Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight index).3 
Each nominal index is expressed in real 
terms (adjusted for inflation), using the 
applicable country’s personal consump-
tion expenditure (PCE) deflator.
The developed-country index of 
real house prices aggregates the 19 
country indexes, each weighted rela-
tive to that nation’s 2005 GDP. Similarly, 
a weighted, average real GDP is cal-
culated for the group. U.S. figures are 
separately investigated.4 House price 
and GDP growth rates for the aggre-
gated 19 OECD countries and the U.S. 
are computed on a quarter-over-quarter, 
annualized basis (Chart 1). U.S. reces-
sions, as designated by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), 
are identified and appear to indicate that 
OECD-19 and U.S. downturns tend to 
be highly correlated.
Chart 1 offers some support for 
an OECD (2005) claim that real house 
prices became “strikingly out of step 
with the business cycle” beginning in 
the 1990s. Real house price growth 
in the OECD-19 bottomed out fol-
lowing the 1991 recession and began 
increasing in the second half of the 
1990s.5 The house price growth rate 
kept climbing until around 2005, 
even though real GDP growth didn’t 
similarly increase and even weakened 
around the 2001 recession. This appar-
ent divergence is somewhat less evi-
dent for the U.S., but it can be argued 
that house price growth in the U.S. 
also resumed in the 1990s and outper-
formed real GDP growth in the first 
half of the 2000s.
Even so, these observations alone 
cannot validate the view that real 
house price and real GDP growth have 
become more dissimilar over time. 
Modeling the dynamics of these series 
may provide more robust empirical sup-
port and clues as to what accounts for 
the apparent break.
Modeling the Data
We model real house price 
growth as alternating between two 
regimes, each characterized by differ-
ent dynamics. Specifically, we allow 
the expected rate of real house price 
growth and its volatility to differ across 
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the two regimes. Applying this model 
to the data—for both the OECD-19 
and U.S.—we obtain estimates of 
expected growth and volatility in 
each regime, as well as the probabil-
ity of switching from one regime to 
the other.
Given those probabilities, we 
can infer for any given quarter in our 
sample how likely it is that real house 
price growth in the OECD-19 and U.S. 
is best characterized by one regime or 
the other, based on the data observed 
to that point.6 We model real GDP 
growth for the OECD-19 and U.S. in 
an analogous way.
Our estimates show that for both 
real house price and real GDP growth—
in the OECD-19 and U.S.—low expect-
ed growth goes hand in hand with 
high volatility. As it turns out, though, 
differences across regimes in expected 
growth are small compared with differ-
ences in the volatility of growth. Thus, 
in what follows, we focus on the dif-
ferences in volatility and, for simplicity, 
refer to our regimes as “high volatility” 
and “low volatility.”
The probabilities that real house 
price growth and real GDP growth 
are in their high-volatility regimes 
are shown in Chart 2. The series are 
derived independently so that the 
probabilities of high volatility in real 
house price growth are not affected 
by the strength of real economic activ-
ity or by the occurrence of the high-
volatility regime for real GDP growth.
How do we interpret these prob-
abilities? For example, consider the 
real house price series for the U.S. 
From 1993 to 2003, the probability 
of being in the high-volatility regime 
is below 0.2 and is often quite a bit 
lower. Based on this, real house price 
growth was almost certainly in its low-
volatility regime over that period. In 
contrast, throughout the most recent 
recession, real house price growth was 
almost certainly in its high-volatility 
regime, with implied probabilities uni-
formly close to 1.
With this illustration in mind to 
help us interpret the empirical evidence 
presented in Chart 2, we see that U.S. 
real house price growth has been in the 
low-volatility regime considerably more 
often than OECD-19 growth has been. 
For U.S. house price growth, volatil-
ity fell around the mid-1980s—roughly 
coinciding with the onset of the Great 
Moderation—and remained low almost 
continuously through the early 2000s, 
interrupted only by the 1990–91 reces-
sion. For OECD-19 house price growth, 
the transition from high to low volatility 
occurred later, around the mid-1990s. 
However, both the U.S. and OECD-19 
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appear to have returned to high-volatili-
ty regimes after the 2001 recession, with 
estimated volatility around six times 
greater than in the low-volatility regimes.
Real GDP growth was rather vola-
tile in the OECD-19 and U.S. during 
the 1970s and early 1980s—a period 
when real house price growth was also 
very volatile. Since around 1984, occur-
rences of the high-volatility regime have 
become rare in both the OECD-19 and 
U.S.—this is characteristic of the Great 
Moderation. Moreover, occurrences of 
the high-volatility regime for real out-
put growth have become closely asso-
ciated with NBER-designated recessions 
in the U.S. 
OECD-19 and U.S. probabilities 
and recessions are highly synchronized, 
especially after 1984. Thus, the corre-
sponding probabilities of high volatil-
ity appear to be a coarse indicator of 
recession.
However, we fail to detect a sus-
tained shift toward high volatility in real 
GDP growth preceding the 2007 global 
downturn similar to the one in the early 
2000s for real house price growth. In 
fact, by this metric, the latest recession is 
indistinguishable from the two preced-
ing ones, in 1990 and 2001. The shift 
toward more volatile real house price 
growth, unaccompanied by a shift in 
the volatility of real GDP growth, offers 
evidence that house price dynamics and 
real output growth may have diverged 
beginning around the 2001 recession.
Beyond the Empirical Facts
A shift in the volatility of real house 
price growth appears to have occurred 
over the last decade without a similar 
change in real GDP growth. Our empiri-
cal findings don’t provide an economic 
rationale for the high- and low-volatility 
periods documented in the data, but 
they suggest a break in the low-volatility 
era that began after 1984 with the Great 
Moderation. Therefore, something other 
than the normal business cycle seems 
to have altered the growth dynamics of 
real house prices toward the high-vola-
tility regime. That possibility is a promis-
ing avenue for additional research.
Mack is a research analyst and Martínez-García is 
a senior research economist at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas.
Notes
1 Interestingly, expected real house price growth 
has remained only slightly below the 3 percent 
expected real GDP expansion rate estimated for 
the U.S. and the OECD since the mid-1970s.
2 For more on the database, see www.dallasfed.
org/institute/houseprice/index.cfm. The OECD-
19 are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S. 
A similar OECD database is used to investigate 
housing markets across the OECD-19. See “A 
Bird’s Eye View of OECD Housing Markets,” by 
Christophe André, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development Working Paper no. 
746, January 2010.
3 Each country’s house price index is extended to 
1975 with historical sources whenever necessary, 
seasonally adjusted over the entire sample period 
and then re-based to 2005 = 100. For more  
details on country data sources and data treat-
ment, see the appendix and methodological 
companion to the house price database available at   
www.dallasfed.org/institute/wpapers/2011/0099.
pdf.
4 House price indexes for all 19 OECD countries 
are deflated using the PCE deflator and aggregated 
using constant, purchasing power parity-adjusted 
GDP weights for 2005. Real GDP in 2005 pur-
chasing power parities is averaged across all 19 
countries using the same constant weights as for 
real house prices.
5 “Recent House Price Developments: The Role 
of Fundamentals,” Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development Economic Outlook, 
no. 78, December 2005.
6 Economists and statisticians refer to this 
framework as a Markov-switching model. We 
incorporate up to six lags for each variable we 
estimate to account for other features of the data 
that cannot be fully captured by this simple two-
regime Markov-switching model specification. For 
further details on the estimation, see the technical 
appendix under “Related Reading” at www. 
dallasfed.org/institute/houseprice/index.cfm. 